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PORTER v. PORTER: SPECIFIC PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTY SEIZED TO SATISFY DEBT
OF INDIVIDUAL PARTNER WITHOUT
DETERMINATION OF INTERVENING
PARTNERS' INTEREST
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Porter v. Porter," recently
upheld an execution upon alleged specific partnership property
without judicial determination of the alleged partners' rights in the
property. This decision appears to be contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Uniform Partnership Act2 which is in force in Arizona.
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the Porter decision in
light of the Uniform Partnership Act's policy of protecting the
business enterprise from disruption by creditors of the individual
partner. Guidelines will be suggested for future determination of
cases in this area that will effectuate the policies of the Act.
Mr. Porter, the debtor partner, was domiciled in Idaho. His
wife, who had moved to Arizona, brought an action in the Arizona
courts for separate maintenance. Mr. Porter was served construc-
tively and did not appear in the Arizona action. The complaint
alleged that the Arizona Hotel in Phoenix was community prop-
erty, and an order was granted attaching the hotel. Mr. Por-
ter's two sisters then intervened claiming a partnership interest in
the hotel. The court issued a pendente lite order for support of
Mrs. Porter and her children, and appointed a receiver to satisfy
the order out of hotel profits. The intervenors petitioned the
Arizona Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The court
quashed the petition on the ground that since prohibition is for
questioning jurisdiction in extraordinary circumstances the inter-
venors' remedy was at trial.3
In August 1959, although the partnership interest had not yet
been adjudicated, an execution was issued for sale of the hotel.
The proceeds were to be applied to arrearages in the pendente lite
support order. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Porter purchased the hotel
at sheriff's sale. The partners moved to vacate the execution sale,
but their motion was denied by the trial court.
During the litigation in Arizona the husband sued for divorce
in Idaho. The wife and partners appeared in this action, the part-
ners asserting their interest in the hotel. In December of 1960,
after the sheriff's sale in Arizona, the Idaho divorce decree was
1. 416 P.2d 564 (Ariz. 1966).
2. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-225, 29-228 (1956).
3. Porter v. Stanford, 86 Ariz. 402, 347 P.2d 35 (1959), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 829 (1962). The receiver also petitioned for a writ of prohibition
and his petition was quashed on the same day as the partners' petition.
Kemble v. Stanford, 86 Ariz. 392, 347 P.2d 28 (1962).
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entered. The Idaho court found a valid partnership interest in
favor of the intervenors, ordered Mrs. Porter to execute quit claims
and releases of her interest in the hotel, and awarded her other
community property. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
this portion of the decree, 4 which was the first determination of
the partnership question since Arizona had not yet tried that issue. 5
The partners returned to the Arizona trial court and filed a
supplemental complaint asking that Arizona give full faith and
credit to the Idaho divorce decree as res judicata concerning the
partnership interest. At trial copies of the Idaho decree were ex-
cluded, no testimony was given, and the only other evidence pre-
sented was the quitclaim deed. A motion for directed verdict was
made and sustained in favor of Mrs. Porter. After a motion for a
new trial was denied, the partners appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Arizona.6
The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the husband
had never appeared and was not subject to in personam jurisdiction
in the separate maintenance suit.7 The court also decided that
since all the parties were present in the Idaho divorce court, its
judgment was the first valid one on the partnership claim and was
res judicata. Notably, the court of appeals did not consider the
trial court's failure to protect the partners' claim or the possibility
that the execution and sale should not be held res judicata because
of the decree's lack of finality among the parties.
Mrs. Porter appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the directed verdict of
the trial court. The supreme court held that the execution and sale
of the hotel were entitled to full faith and credit in the Idaho
divorce court as a final determination of Mr. Porter's interest in
the property." The court's reasoning was that the sale converted
the hotel into separate property, thereby depriving the Idaho court
of jurisdiction since Idaho divorce courts have jurisdiction over
community property only.9
4. Porter v. Porter, 84 Idaho 400, 373 P.2d 327 (1962). The portion
of the decree modified was that which prohibited Mrs. Porter from taking
any other action concerning the property distribution.
5. The Arizona trial court's proceedings were ex parte as to Mr.
Porter since he was constructively served and never appeared. The execu-
tion and sale of the hotel were in the nature of a default judgment against
Mr. Porter. The partnership issue, however, had never come to trial in
Arizona at the time of the Idaho divorce decree.
6. Porter v. Porter, 1 Ariz. App. 363, 403 P.2d 298 (1965).
7. This conclusion appear3 to be erroneous since in personam juris-
diction is not necessary for jurisdiction to vest. A court has jurisdiction to
enter a judgment in rem when the property is within the state and under
the power of the court and the party is constructively served according to
statute. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U.S. 269 (1917);
Porter v. Duke, 34 Ariz. 217 (1928).
8. Porter v. Porter, 416 P.2d 564 (Ariz. 1966).
9. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (1963) gives divorce courts power to
[Vol. 71
Spring 1967]
The problem in Porter was the trial court's failure to protect
the substantive rights alleged by the intervening partners. This
set the stage for the litigation that followed. The Arizona courts
failed to consider the letter or policy of the Uniform Partnership
Act,'0 which protects partnership property from disruption or seiz-
ure for debts of individual partners. They also failed to consider
how the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure operate on partial judg-
ments in multiple party actions. The rules gave finality to this
type of judgment only under strict conditions."
Arizona's initial jurisdiction over the hotel appears to be valid.
distribute community property. See also Heslip v. Heslip, 74 Idaho 368,
262 P.2d 999 (1953) where this is interpreted as excluding separate property.
10. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-225 (1956): Nature of a partner's
right in specific partnership property provides in part:
A. A partner is co-owner with his partner of specific partnership
property holding as a tenant in partnership.
B. The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
3. A partner's right in specific partnership property is not sub-
ject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against
the partnership. When partnership property is attached for
a partnership debt the partners or any of them or the rep-
resentatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right
under the homestead or exemption laws.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-229
(1956) Partner's interest subject to charging order
A. On due application to a competent court by any judgment
creditor of a partner, the court which entered the judgment,
order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of
the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of
such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then or
later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and any
other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the part-
nership, and make all other orders, directions, accounts and
inquiries which the debtor partner might have made, or which
the circumstances of the case may require.
B. The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before fore-
closure, or in case of a sale being directed by the court may be
purchased without thereby causing a dissolution:
1. With separate property, by any one or more of the partners,
or
2. With partnership property, by any one or more of the part-
ners whose interests are not so charged or sold.
C. Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a partner of
his right, if any, under the exemption laws, as regards his in-
terest in the partnership.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 28.
11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 54:b (1956):
Judgment upon multiple claims. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third party claim, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all the claims
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, an order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than
all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.
NOTES
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Constructive service upon the defendant, Mr. Porter,12 is a suffi-
cient procedure because the property is within the state and sub-
ject to the court's power.13 An Arizona statute provides that sep-
arate maintenance actions be handled as actions for divorce, 14 and
the divorce statutes provide for the exercise of power over property
in general.1" Up to this point everything was in order. The inter-
vention into a suit by persons asserting partnership interests brings
other law into the picture, however, despite the general rule that
an intervenor cannot complain of the propriety of procedure and
must take the case as he finds it.'6 Cases considering the protection
of partnerships in multiple party proceedings cannot be found.
The Uniform Partnership Act, however, does not allow individual
creditors of a partner to proceed directly against specific partner-
ship property.17 That prohibition should be extended to cases
where the partnership issue arises by way of intervention, since
the protection of substantive partnership interests should not turn
upon the number of litigants.
In Arizona, the property rights of partners, exemption of part-
nership property from certain legal processes, and the method by
which creditors of individual partners can reach the debtor's inter-
est in partnership property are controlled by statute. The Uniform
Partnership Act provides that "a partner's right in specific part-
nership property is not subject to attachment or execution except
on a claim against the partnership."'" The Act also describes the
procedure by which a judgment creditor of one partner may gain
access to the partnership property:
On due application to a competent court by a judgment
creditor of a partner, the court which rendered the judg-
ment, order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the
interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatis-
fied debt with interest thereon; and may then or later ap-
point a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other
money due or to fall due to him in respect of the partner-
12. Asaz. REV. STAT. ANN., Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 4: e: 1 (1956).
13. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U.S. 269 (1917);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Porter v. Duke, 34 Ariz. 217, 270 Pac.
625 (1928). The court may subject the property to its power by attach-
ment as in the Pennington case, by appointment of a receiver, Burkhart v.
Circuit Ct. of Eleventh Judicial Cir. 146 Fla. 457, 1 So.2d 872 (1941);
Forrester v. Forrester, 155 Ga. 722, 118 S.E. 373 (1923), or by having spe-
cific reference made to the property in the complaint, Wilson v. Smart, 324
Ill. 276, 155 N.E. 289 (1927); Hamil v. Hamil, 106 Okla. 14, 232 Pac. 823
(1924).
14. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-342 (1956).
15. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-315 (1956) does not exclude commu-
nity property which the hotel appeared to be.
16. E.g., Bancroft v. Allen, 128 Fla. 14, 174 So. 749 (1937); Strader v.
Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 1 of Coles County,
413 Ill. 610, 110 N.E. 2d 191 (1953).
17. Aaxz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-225, 29-228 (1956).
18. Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-225 (1956).
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ship, and make all other orders, directions, accounts or in-
quiries which the debtor partner might have made, or
which the circumstances of the case may require.19
Under these sections, as construed in other jurisdictions, a
partner's interest in specific partnership property is held subject to
attachment or execution only when the claim is against the part-
nership.20 The remedy for a judgment creditor of an individual
partner (like Mrs. Porter) is the statutory charging order,21 which
reaches only the distributive share of a debtor partner in specific
patnership property. All claims against the partnership must first
be satisfied and the other partners' shares protected. The charging
order is not a lien against any specific property of the partner-
ship.2 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has said:
The creditor of the individual partner ... can be paid
only out of what remains to the individual partner as his
share of the profits after the partnership obligations, in-
cluding those of any judgment credit of the partnership
have been satisfied.
23
This procedure effectively protects the substantive rights of both
the other partners and partnership creditors.
rn Porter the initial attachment was proper as long as the two
original parties were before the court. When third parties inter-
vened alleging a partnership interest in the property, however, the
procedure should have been modified to conform to that specified
by the UPA, at least until the validity of the intervenors' claim
was determined.
The Arizona Supreme Court had already settled the issue of
priority of the partnership interest over a community property in-
terest in a prior decision. In Cummings v. Weast 24 the court said:
[S]ubject to the primary charge of any liabilities to which
the partnership may be subjected . . . the power of the
partnership and its members over assets, either wholly or
in part made up of community property predominates over
any rights which the community may have in regard to the
same. Community rights and powers can only become the
prevailing consideration in such a case after all partner-
ship obligations and powers have been fully discharged and
satisfied.
25
In that case the husband had conveyed his interest in certain part-
19. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-228 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
20. E.g., Sherwood v. Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 8 P.2d 943 (1932);
Townsend v. L.J. Appel Sons, Inc., 164 Md. 255, 164 Ati. 679 (1933).
21. Baum v. Baum, 51 Cal.2d 610, 335 P.2d 481 (1959); Weisinger v.
Rae, 19 Misc.2d 341, 188 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
22. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 303 Ill. 41, 135 N.E. 21 (1922);
Shirk v. Caterbone, 201 Pa. Super. 544, 193 A.2d 664 (1963).
23. Shirk v. Caterbone, 201 Pa. Super. 544, 547, 193 A.2d 664, 665
(1963).
24. 72 Ariz. 93, 231 P.2d 439 (1951).
25. Id. at 100, 231 P.2d at 443.
NOTES
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
nership realty to his partner for cash, as an adjustment of the
equities between them. The court held that the community inter-
est of the conveying partner's wife in the property could not pre-
vail over the rights of partners to adjust equities between them-
selves.
In United States v. Worley,2 a federal court construed the
Tennessee Uniform Partnership Act to protect the substantive
rights in a partnership by holding that a widow's interest derived
from a separation agreement was only an interest in the surplus
after all partnership debts were satisfied. The wife there had no
interest in specific partnership property. The case arose when the
partnership's successor corporation became bankrupt, and the court
decided that the widow had no interest in parcels of real estate
that were assets of the partnership. The trustee was ordered to
sell the land, and the wife shared in the proceeds only after the
bankrupt's debts were satisfied.
In Mazzuchelli v. Siberberg,2 T the New Jersey Supreme Court
said in dictum that the policy behind the Uniform Partnership Act
is partially to protect "the business operations against the immedi-
ate impact of personal involvements of the partners."28
Thus the procedural protection of substantive rights in partner-
ships is clear. The policy is to determine all of the rights to part-
nership property and to satisfy those interests before the property
is applied to individual debts of a partner, whether or not they
arise out of his marital status. The UPA and the cases arising
under it indicate that the Arizona courts were wrong in the Porter
case. The clarity of the Uniform Partnership Act and its policy
foundations are reinforced by the fact that no other case can be
found where the instant question was presented, much less decided
as it was in Porter.
Another aspect of the Porter decision is the Arizona Supreme
Court's failure to observe the Rules of Civil Procedure which the
court itself had promulgated. 29  The rules, a code similar to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"0 provide for a less than final
judgment in the Porter setting. In regard to judgments in multi-
ple party proceedings the rules provide:
54(b) Judgment upon multiple claims. When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all the claims only after an express de-
termination that there is no just reason for delay and
26. 213 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1954).
27. 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959).
28. Id. at 17, 148 A.2d at 11.
29. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-109, 12-111 (1956) provide for pro-
mulgation of the rules of court by the Supreme Court of Arizona.
30. Compare ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rules of Civ. Proc. (1956) with
FED. R. Civ. P.
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upon express direction for entry of judgment. In the ab-
sence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of de-
cision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims.31
It is evident that in multiple party actions judgments affecting
less than all the parties cannot be final as long as there are sub-
stantive rights to be decided. Decisions like the Porter execution
sale, lacking finality, are therefore not entitled to full faith and
credit.3 2 This is another ground upon which the trial court should
have been reversed. The procedural rule, if followed, makes ade-
quate provision for rectifying such errors by viewing these judg-
ments as not final. In Porter no consideration was given to this
obvious protection for third party intervenors.
CONCLUSION
If the Arizona Supreme Court had properly held that the exe-
cution sale was not entitled to full faith and credit in Idaho, the
hotel would have still been community property. As such it would
have been squarely within the power of the Idaho divorce court.33
The Idaho decree would have been the first valid judgment on the
property, entitling it to full faith and credit in Arizona. The Ari-
zona court did not adjudicate the partnership issue until after the
Idaho divorce decree, thereby ignoring the Uniform Partnership
Act, prior case law, and its own procedural rules.
The Arizona Supreme Court should have held that an inter-
venor's substantive rights require protection even if it means a
change in trial procedure. It should also have mandated that the
Uniform Partnership Act's procedure be used and its policy ob-
served whenever partnership rights are asserted. The court should
also have concluded that the execution sale was not a final judg-
ment under Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Porter case in Arizona now stands for the proposition that
when a partner's name is not on a deed to partnership property,
the property may be sold by execution sale for the benefit of an-
other partner's creditors after he has intervened, but before his
interest has been determined. Jurisdictions adhering to the Uni-
form Partnership Act 34 should beware the obvious pitfalls of
Porter v. Porter.
ROBERT H. LONG, JR.
31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Rules of Cir. Proc., Rule 54:b (1956). (Em-
phasis added.)
32. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909). Under the full faith and
credit clause a judgment must inter alia be a final adjudication to come
under the purview of the Constitution.
33. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (1963).
34. Forty-four jurisdictions had adopted the Uniform Partnership Act
as of 1965. 7 UNiF. L. ANN. 7 (Supp. 1965).
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